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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
found that on each of these occasions, the lessor had remonstrat-
ed and warned about the lateness and further specified that their
acceptance was not to be considered as a waiver. The lower
court's judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
Liens and Privileges
The Louisiana Constitution requires that privileges and mort-
gages on immovable property (with certain exceptions) must be
recorded in order to affect third persons, and it also provides
that "privileges on movable property shall exist without registra-
tion of same, except in such cases as may be prescribed by law."'
While the last part of this provision authorizes the legislature to
require recordation for any specific privilege on movables, it is
clearly by way of exception and must therefore be interpreted
strictly rather than liberally.
In the series of statutes (1934, 1940, 1942),2 which established
the liens and privileges on oil wells, property and equipment, a
priority over the statutory liens for work and supplies was given
to a vendor's lien if it existed and was recorded before the begin-
ning of the work or the furnishing of supplies. This provoked
the question of whether these statutes created an exception
(as permitted in the constitution) by requiring the recordation
of a vendor's lien on movable property in order to enjoy the pri-
ority over the statutory liens, and for the 1934 statute it was
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 19.
2. La. Act 145 of 1934, § 2: ". . . such lien and privilege [for services or sup-
plies] shall be superior to all other liens and privileges or mortgages against
said property, except taxes or a bona fide vendor's lien and privilege, provided
such vendor's lien and privilege exists and is recorded before the work
or the furnishing of . . .supplies is begun."
La. Act 100 of 1940, § 2-B: "That as to movable property said vendor's
lien and privilege must exist and be filed for record within seven days after
said property, subject to the vendor's lien and privilege, is delivered to the
well or wells. Said vendor's lien and privilege shall be evidenced by a written
instrument signed by the purchaser and when authentic in form or duly
acknowledged, shall be filed for record in the records of the parish where the
well or wells is located. The effect of said filing shall prevent said movables
from becoming immovable by nature or destination. The property shall be
described in such a manner as to be reasonably subject to identification and
either the premises on which the property is located or is to be located, shall
be stated. Filing, recordation and preservation shall be in the same manner
and form and in the same book as now provided for the recordation of chat-
tel mortgages, but the recorder shall enter under the heading *Remarks'
the words, 'Vendor's Lien.'"
La. Act 68 of 1942, § 2-B, is the same as La. Act 100 of 1940, § 2-B.
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answered in the negative by the 1940 federal court case of In re
Lent.3
The 1940 statute evidently set out to correct this situation
and revised -both the title and the text of the 1934 act so as to
set out more specifically the requirement and the manner of
recordation as one of the necessary conditions for the priority
granted to a vendor's lien over the statutory liens in favor of
laborers and materialmen. The legislative intent in this regard is
clear, and although there may conceivably be objection as to the
method of this legislative expression for a matter so narrowly
hemmed in by the Constitution, this issue has not received seri-
ous attention by the court.
In the 1949 case of H. H. Transportation Company v. Owens
4
all members of the court apparently accepted the statute as pro-
viding adequately both the requirement and the manner of re-
cordation for a vendor's lien on movables as a condition for its
ranking priority. Under these circumstances it is somewhat sur-
prising that the majority of the supreme court-concurring in
the opinion of the district judge-picked on some of the collateral
language of the statute "property . . . delivered to the well or
wells" as a means of cutting away its application where delivery
was not to a well but merely to the site before the commencement
of operations. Thus the vendor's lien on an entire drilling rig was
given the priority, on the ground that the statute did not require
its recordation. The concurring opinion of Justice McCaleb5 re-
fused to follow this .distinction but accepted what had actually
been done as compliance with the statutory requirement of re-
cordation.
To sustain the priority of the vendor's lien on movable pro-
perty, there might have been raised the question as to the con-
stitutionality of the recordation requirement which is an original
and independent provision in a statute otherwise devoted to the
creation and ranking of laborers' and materialmen's liens on oil
wells and equipment. There is no other text of law which pro-
vides for the recordation of a vendor's lien on movable property,
and in order to establish this requirement the legislative ex-
pression would have to meet the strict interpretation of the ex-
ception permitted in the Constitution, Article XIX, Section 19.
3. 34 F. Supp. 700 (D.C. La. 1940). Judge Porterie considered the language
in the 1934 act which referred to recordation of vendor's lien on movables as
"surplusage, meaningless and ineffectual."
4. 214 La. 985, 39 So.(2d) 441 (1949).
5. 214 La. 985, 996, 39 So.(2d) 441, 445.
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This possibility was not considered by the court since it gave
judgment in favor of the vendor in this case on another ground.
IV. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
Landowner's Liability to Trespassing Children
The extent of a landowner's duty to protect trespassing child-
ren from the danger of drowning in a pond or other body of
water maintained on his premises cannot be easily, defined. It
is admittedly difficult to devise adequate protective measures
against such risk without frequently imposing heavy financial
burdens on the proprietor or seriously interfering with his effec-
tive use of his own property. This is particularly true in Louisiana
where the topography of the countryside makes the use of canals
and other drainage facilities a necessity. Furthermore, in this state
there is an obvious overspreading risk of unavoidable drowning
in the many natural bodies of water such as bayous, swamps,,
and rivers which characterize our terrain. For this reason, the
peril of drowning is one to which the child populace of this state
would continue to be exposed even if all man-made bodies of
water were adequately safeguarded.
The difficulty of working out a compromise formula which
would operate fairly for both landowner and trespassing children
has induced many courts to close the door to recovery by an-
nouncing that the "attractive nuisance" doctrine (which would be
the springboard for recovery in such situations) does not apply
to ponds and other bodies of water.' In the past the Louisiana
courts have consistently given judgment for the defendant in
cases of this type.2  Recently, however, in the case, Saxton v.
Plum Orchards, Incorporated,3 the supreme court was faced with
a tragic occurrence which convinced it that simple rule-of-thumb
action denying recovery is too harsh in the drowning cases. The
facts of the Plum Orchards case indicate that in 1942 defendant
had developed several acres of property in New Orleans as a sub-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See cases collected (1925) 36 A.L.R. 224; (1926) 45 A.L.R. 992; (1928) 53
A.L.R. 1354; (1929) 60 A.L.R. 1453.
2. McKenna v. City of Shreveport, 133 So. 524 (La. App. 2d cir. 1931);
Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491 (La. App. 2d cir. 1936); Fincher v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918).
3. 215 La. 378, 40 So.(2d) 791 (1949).
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